Om cannabispolitik
I senaste utgåvan av Psychiatry (2009, 22:258-262) konstaterar Wayne Hall och Michael Lynskey under rubriken The challenges in developing a rational cannabis policy sammanfattningsvis att utveckling av en mer rationell cannabispolitik kräver bättre utvärderingar både av hälsoeffekter och kostnader och fördelar med att verkställa det nuvarande förbudet mot användning [av cannabis]. Det kräver också en liberalisering av det internationella kontrollsystemet i syfte att tillåta medlemsstater att experimentera med olika metoder för att reglera och kontrollera användning av cannabis eller klarare uttryckt - herrar Hall och Lynskey har inget emot experiment med reglering och kontroll av användningen av cannabis.
John J. Coleman, PhD, president för Drug Watch International är av en helt annan åsikt och konstaterar följande I ett meddelande till Hall & Lynskey:
Dear Messrs. Hall & Lynskey,
Your discussion regarding taxing "legal" cannabis is pure fiction, in my opinion. Cannabis was unregulated in the United States, for example, until 1937, when our Congress enacted the Marihuana Tax Act, prohibiting for the first time public commerce in untaxed marihuana. This law remained on the books until repealed by the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. By then, cannabis use had increased significantly. In 1968, the Marihuana Tax Act was challenged in the Supreme Court and portions of it were overturned. In its review and critique of the law, the Court took notice of the fact that virtually no tax revenue had been collected by the government during the three decades-plus that the marihuana "tax" law was in effect.
I cannot speak for Australia but as far as the U.S. is concerned, a legitimate government-regulated cannabis industry would never be able to compete with the black market on price or production cost, the latter no doubt being further constrained by state labor laws, quality control requirements, overhead costs for facilities, warehousing, distribution, sales, insurance, personnel, etc. In short, the illicit market in drugs is the epitome of free-market unconstrained entrepreneurial success. As such, if its business were ever threatened by lawful competition, it would simply produce more and better for cheaper and serve everyone, including those refused by the licensed brokers (e.g., children, convicted felons, insane, etc.). Using the taxing authority of the state to prohibit or restrict commodities works only when and if the commodity is difficult to acquire or produce (e.g., liquor, cigarettes, automobile tires, gasoline, guns, etc.). The idea of taxing cannabis fits nicely with the notion of taxing dandelions and butterflies.
For even a better example and one that's closer to home, check what occurred in China in the 19th century. In 1858, to end the second of two "Opium Wars," the Treaty of Tientsin was signed by Britain and China but the Chinese ultimately refused to honor its terms and hostilities continued. The 1860 Convention of Peking brought the sides together and the Chinese agreed to ratify the terms of the earlier treaty and, in the process, accepted additional demands. One of the demands forced China to impose a tariff on all imports of opium, ostensibly to address the social consequences of opium smoking. This, in effect, legalized imported opium and provided grounds for China to ban the production and distribution of untaxed domestic opium. It also gave British merchants a monopoly on the drug trade. (Booth M, 1996; Hanes III WT & Sanello F, 2002)
Historians, however, note with some irony that the British scheme to legalize opium had the unintended consequence of stimulating domestic production of opium in China. As the insatiable demand for smoking opium spread throughout the provinces, there emerged an entire underworld devoted to producing, transporting, and selling untaxed Chinese opium. Although inferior in morphine content, domestic opium was potent and cheap enough to satisfy the masses. (Madancy JA, 2001)
In 1893, Britain's Queen Victoria, responding to growing criticism at home and abroad, formed a Royal Commission to study the opium trade between India and China. In its report to the Queen whose titles included Empress of India, the Commission concluded that, "the temperate use of opium in India should be viewed in the same light as the temperate use of alcohol in England." The Commission largely ignored the effect of the opium trade on China. (Madancy JA, 2003)
Less than five years later, The Times of London reported that an estimated 70 percent of adult males in China used opium. (Fay PW, 1975) By then, two violent and bloody conflicts waged over the opium trade had failed to stop what some called "the addiction of one empire and the corruption of another." (Hanes III WT & Sanello F, 2002).
Ironically, the harsh lesson of this taxing scheme has been ignored by today's drug policy reformers who advocate legalizing cannabis, for example, so that it can be taxed by the state. This, they claim, would drive away the smugglers and other criminals and generate needed funds to deal with excessive and problematic use, much the same as was promised by the British to promote the treaty provisions that legalized and taxed opium in China.
Unfortunately, it would take many more years, millions and millions of lost lives, and, ultimately, a brutal and murderous dictator to finally undo the health and social consequences of these provisions. Perhaps we can learn something from history.
Är du intresserad av att läsa hela artikeln I Psychaitry kan du skicka ett meddelande till [email protected] .
Torgny Peterson
